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Introduction
• Crewed launch vehicles contain a series 
of abort options
• Ground Control and Range Safety are 
able to manual initiate aborts and the 
flight safety system
• However, due to the very fast response 
time required to ensure safety of the 
crew in many abort scenarios, the flight 
computers are able to initiate automatic 
aborts
• An automated abort will safe the vehicle 
by cutting off the engines, get the crew 
capsule away from the vehicle, and if 
necessary activate the flight safety 
system 2
Automated Aborts
• Flight computers monitor sensor data to 
determine if abort actions should be 
initiated based on current flight 
conditions
• These range from simply warnings to 
immediately aborting and initiating the 
flight safety system
• Failure to identify an out of range 
condition it is considered a false 
negative failure
• If the flight computer takes an abort 
action when conditions are nominal it is 
considered a false positive failure
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Sensor Failure Modes
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• Sensor failure modes include ‘fail high’ 
and ‘fail low’
• Fail High - upon failure the signal will be 
at the upper range
• Fail Low - upon failure the signal be at 
the lower range
• Either sensor failure can potentially lead 
to a false positive OR a false negative 
failure depending on the limits for that 
parameter
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Sensor False Negative Mitigation
• To protect against false negative failures a variety of 
methods are used
• Sensor Redundancy
• Sensor failure logic resiliency
• Sensors for multiple independent flight conditions
• Unfortunately, most of these will inadvertently increase the 
false positive risk
• This presentation will review PRA analysis of several 
common methods to mitigate false negative risks and 
present sensitivities showing how the methods affect false 
negative and positive risks
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Additional Considerations
• Software used to interpret the signals will be modified when 
using any of these methodologies 
• This increase in complexity, will in turn decrease software reliability
• This can be a driver in decreasing over-all reliability when you 
are trying to mitigate it
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Quantitative Analysis Using Notional 
Sensor Hardware
• In the following examples we will 
be looking at two kinds of sensors
• The first has a failure mode 
distribution of 15% Fails High, and 
85% Fails Low with a reliability of 
0.99999
• The second sensor has a failure 
mode evenly split with a reliability of 
0.999995
• These are notional, but realistic 
failure probabilities
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• A false negative will be defined as 
a failed low signal from all 
sensors
• In our examples this would cause a 
failure to abort when the situation 
would require an abort
• A false positive will be defined as 
any failed high sensor
• In our example this causes a 
spurious abort
Sensor Redundancy
• Adding another sensor reduces the false negative risk 
exposure
• This however increases exposure to false positive failures
• Depending on the sensor configuration’s failure mode 
distribution this can end up leading to a higher over-all loss of 
mission risk
• Increase in software complexity decreases software reliability
• False negative is not lowered as much as may be expected 
due to Common Cause
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Scenario Fails to Abort Spurious Abort Total Total+SW
One Sensor 1 in 120,000 1 in 670,000 1 in 100,000 1 in 91,000
Two Sensors 1 in 1,700,000 1 in 330,000 1 in 280,000 1 in 210,000
Failure to Abort
Spurious Abort
Sensor Failure Logic Resiliency
• Adding a three of four required sensor 
logic reduces both false negative and 
positive
• This will again decrease software 
reliability, but generally not enough to 
outweigh the benefits
• While this lowers the overall risk, it also 
increases flight sensor hardware, and 
may not be feasible when modifying a 
current design due to cost and 
schedule constraints 9
Scenario Fails to Abort Spurious Abort Total Total+SW
One Sensor 1 in 120,000 1 in 670,000 1 in 100,000 1 in 91,000
3/4 Sensor logic 1 in 980,000 1 in 5,600,000 1 in 830,000 1 in 310,000
Failure to Abort
Spurious Abort logic will be identical, but with fails 
high. 
Applying Independent Sensor Check
• Using multiple parameters, such as 
temperature and pressure to self check
• 3/3 low signals leads to a false negative
• 1/3 high signals triggers the abort
• Essentially reduces all risk due to a 
false negative, due to independent 
sensor failure allowing common cause 
to be less of an issue
• Adds significant software complexity, 
decreasing reliability of software
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Scenario Fails to Abort Spurious Abort Total Total+SW
One Sensor 1 in 120,000 1 in 670,000 1 in 100,000 1 in 91,000
Independent Sensor added < 1 in 1,000,000,000 1 in 250,000 1 in 250,000 1 in 190,000
Failure to Abort
Spurious Abort
Design Change
• In a hypothetical design change, a redundant sensor design was found to be too susceptible to false 
positive failure, driven by common cause failures
• This leads to an effort to redesign the sensors to make use of an independent sensor already 
available
• The change will essentially remove the chance of a false negative failure
• However, due to the software changes required and the additional risk of false positive from the 
added sensor, PRA results show that the change will lead to an overall decrease in reliability
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Scenario Fails to Abort Spurious Abort Total Total+SW
Two Sensors 1 in 1,700,000 1 in 330,000 1 in 280,000 1 in 210,000
Independent Sensor added 1 in 250,000 < 1 in 1,000,000,000 1 in 250,000 1 in 190,000
Summary /Conclusion
• The failure of sensors used in automatic aborts can lead to two very different failure scenarios based 
on the failure mode
• Components, such as sensors, that have multiple failure modes and effects, can lead to unintentional 
risk increases if design changes are focused on improving only one of these effects.
• When performing a design change, risk-based analysis with a PRA model is a critical input for risk-
based decision making
• This gives decision makers a full picture of the risk that will be incurred/removed from the system 
based on the proposed change
• When analyzing sensors, or any component with varying failure modes and effects, using a fully 
integrated system model to ensure all risk changes are captured is vital
• The best option reliability wise is resiliency using a voting logic. This has a higher reliability for both 
failure modes. Cost, vehicle weight, and schedule often require a compromise, using a PRA in 
tandem with design will help balance risk vs. costs 
12
